Enhancing Influenza surveillance in Thailand

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Review of Surveillance, Epidemiologic Analysis and Mathematical Modeling for Pandemic and Seasonal influenza


> WHO-MOPH Evaluation Thailand October 5-9, 2009

We observed that...

- Thailand has a strong and well-networked public and private healthcare system and an outstanding public laboratory system
- Across Thailand, epidemiologists, laboratory scientists and clinicians have responded valiantly to the current pandemic to improve and expand existing influenza surveillance
- We do not believe any other large country has implemented such an extensive array of pandemic surveillance systems in such a short period


Surveillance for influenza


- · Reporting of influenza case and dead
- Monitor influenza-like-illness proportion
- Monitor situation & circulating influenza types at sentinel sites (at least 3 agencies)
- Cluster of cases or outbreak
- Adverse event following immunization





506: Limitations for Influenza

- Consistently underreports influenza
 - Most influenza is never lab-confirmed
 - Most physicians do not use influenza diagnosis
 - Private sector not participating fully
- Reporting is driven by ICD10 codes
 - Not precise subject to bias and errors
- Human resources have not followed increased health-care utilization
- Data not being used to influence policy









Sentinel Pandemic Surveillance: Strengths


- Includes pneumonia inpatients
- Geographically representative
- Laboratory confirmation
- Uses clinical case definitions
- Collects both epidemiological and virological data from children and adults

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Sentinel Pandemic Surveillance: Limitations

- Does not provide denominators
 - e.g. Total OPD patients seen, total pneumonia
- Budget not secured
- Overlapping objectives with NIH system
- Sites selected by convenience- needs assessment of representativeness

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NIH Sentinel Surveillance: Strengths

- Laboratory confirmed
- WHO case definition for specimen collection
- Weekly reporting
- Geographically representative
- Data available from multiple years
- Describes all influenza types, subtypes
- Contributes to WHO Global Surveillance


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NIH Sentinel Surveillance: Limitations

- Outpatients only
- No denominator data collected
- Based on convenience sampling
- Externally funded (US CDC)

Highest Priority

Thailand needs a comprehensive, written 5-year strategic plan that describes a <u>vision</u> for influenza surveillance and control in both pandemic and interpandemic periods.



Conclusions

- Keep case reporting (only for hospitalized cases)
- Merge sentinel sites between DDC and Thai NIH
- Monitor of ILI and start investigation of outbreak and dead

IEIP/BOE Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance

Date Started	2003
Primary Objective	Document etiology and burden of influenza and other respiratory pathogens
Ownership	CDC-IEIP and BOE
Data Source	20 hospitals in 2 provinces

IEIP/BOE Surveillance: Limitations

- Panel of diagnostic testing is costly
- Requires dedicated staff
- Only covers pneumonia inpatients
- Not geographically representative
- Externally funded

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IEIP/BOE Surveillance: Strengths

- Population based
- Laboratory-confirmation
- System can study multiple pathogens
- Able to calculate incidence
- Uses clinical case definitions